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INTRODUCTION 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),1 created heightened 
pleading standards in securities-fraud cases. 2  To satisfy this heavier burden, plaintiffs must 
identify each misleading or false statement and explain how each statement is misleading.3 In 
addition, plaintiffs must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant[s] acted with the required state of mind.”4 This standard is often difficult to satisfy as 
it is challenging to produce evidence that demonstrates an individual had the requisite scienter.5 
However, the heightened standard for pleading scienter in securities fraud cases can be 
even more complicated when considering a defendant that is a corporation “because there is the 
additional question of whose knowledge and state of mind matters.”6 The Sixth Circuit properly 
referred to the PSLRA as an “elephant-sized boulder blocking” a plaintiff’s suit as these 
requirements are not easily satisfied.7 “This is especially so considering, for example, in the 
context of a forward-looking statement, that the plaintiff must ‘prove that [a] forward-
looking statement . . . was made with actual knowledge’ to prevail, a formidable burden at the 
pleading stage.”8 The question at hand is must the person misrepresenting a material fact in the 
name of the corporation have also done so with scienter, or is it enough that some person in the 
corporate structure had the requisite state of mind.9 
                                                        
1 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. 
2 Id. 
3 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B). 
4  15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).  
5 KBC Asset Mgmt. N.V. v. Omnicare, Inc. (In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 769 F.3d 455, 461 
(6th Cir. 2014). 
6 Id. at 469. 
7 Id. at 461. 
8 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 554 (6th Cir. 2001). 
9 In re Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 473. 
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In dealing with the issues raised by corporate scienter, the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits in varying degrees have adopted the view that scienter may be imputed to the 
corporation only where the person who made the alleged misstatement attributable to the 
company made the statement with knowledge of its falsity.10  On the other end of the spectrum, 
other the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit courts, have advocated with some variations that 
plaintiffs may meet their pleading burden by alleging facts creating a strong inference that 
someone whose intent could be imputed to the corporation acted with the requisite scienter, even 
if that person is not a named defendant.11 In the most broad interpretation, the Sixth Circuit 
previously found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that an officer of the corporate defendant 
was aware that the statements at issue were false or misleading and held that the officer’s 
knowledge could be attributed to the corporation even though the complaint did not link the 
executive to the issuance of the statements.12  
However, the Sixth Circuit’s current approach in Omnicare is an attempt to create a 
middle ground standard in this spectrum of corporate scienter pleading requirement cases.13 In its 
most recent decision, the Sixth Circuit advanced the position that the state(s) of mind of the 
individual agent who uttered or issued the misrepresentation; or an individual agent who 
authorized, requested, commanded, furnished information for, prepared, reviewed, or approved 
the statement in which the misrepresentation was made before its utterance or issuance, or any 
                                                        
10 Joseph M. McLaughlin, Pleading Corporate Scienter: Circuits Split on Standard, 252 
N.Y.L.J. 5, (2014) (referring to Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, 365 F.3d 353, 
366 (5th Cir. 2004); In re Tyson Foods, 155 Fed. Appx. 53, 57 (3d Cir. 2005); Phillips v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, 374 F.3d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
11 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc, 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008); Teamsters 
Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc, 531 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2008). 
12 City of Monroe Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 688-89 (6th Cir. 2005) 
13 In re Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 476. 
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high managerial agent or member of the board of directors who ratified, recklessly disregarded, 
or tolerated the misrepresentation after its utterance or issuance are probative for determining 
whether a misrepresentation made by a corporation was made with the requisite intent.14 
Congress designed the PSLRA to curb perceived abuses of the private action—“nuisance 
filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests and manipulation by 
class action lawyers.”15 As such, securities fraud cases require a deviation from the normally 
uniform pleading standards.16 This deviation evidences the unique nature of securities fraud 
actions and the delicate balance a court must strike when considering them.17  
On one hand, a court must weigh the important public interests in protecting shareholders 
from the fraudulent conduct of corporate officers and directors, and in providing purchasers with 
a remedy for injuries related to such conduct.18 On the other hand, a court must consider an 
equally important interest in protecting corporations from baseless strike suits filed by 
opportunists looking to make a quick buck.19 Faced with the prospect of expensive discovery, 
reputational damage, and a potentially enormous damages award, corporate defendants have a 
great incentive to settle even non-meritorious cases.20 
In this article, I will first give a background on securities fraud statutes generally. Then I 
will proceed to discuss scienter and go through an analysis of each circuit’s interpretation of 
scienter. After which, I will discuss the new middle ground standard for scienter and it 
implications and advantages. Finally, I will address how the new standard is not necessarily in 
                                                        
14 Id. 
15 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (U.S. 2007). 
16 Erica E. Bonnet, Note, Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital 
Inc., 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 395, 396 (2010). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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the middle of the spectrum for scienter but rather leaning towards the narrow interpretation of 
scienter. Lastly, I will focus on the need of an actual middle ground approach that strikes the 
correct balance between the narrow and broad scienter approaches.  
BACKGROUND 
 In order to pursue a securities fraud action under the PSLRA, a plaintiff must allege that 
the defendant made misleading statements and omissions in reference to an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading.21 The plaintiff’s 
complaint must specifically allege each misleading statement, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on 
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is 
formed.22 After which, the requisite state of mind, scienter, is then considered.23 In general, in 
any private action in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the 
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or 
omission alleged to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.24  
                                                        
21 15 USCS § 78u-4(b)(1). 
22 Id. 
23 15 USCS § 78u-4(b)(2). 
24 Id. (The exception is the case of an action for money damages brought against a credit rating 
agency or a controlling person under 15 USCS §§ 78a et seq., it shall be sufficient, for purposes 
of pleading any required state of mind in relation to such action, that the complaint state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the credit rating agency knowingly or 
recklessly failed to either conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with respect to 
the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology for evaluating credit risk; or to obtain 
reasonable verification of such factual elements from other sources that the credit rating agency 
considered to be competent and that were independent of the issuer and underwriter.) 
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Similarly under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, There are six elements to a 
securities-fraud suit: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; 
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) 
loss causation.”25  
 The focus of this comment, “scienter,” is “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”26  Section 10(b) forbids a company or an individual “to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading.”27 Under the PSLRA and Section 10(b), a plaintiff must allege that a defendant 
possessed scienter at the time of the material misstatement or omission.28  
There is difficulty, however, ascertaining whether a corporation has the requisite scienter. 
When the defendant is a corporate entity—with no single mind of its own—whose state of mind 
matters for purposes of the scienter analysis?29  As the Sixth Circuit recently asked in In re 
Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., “must the person misrepresenting a material fact in the name of the 
corporation have also done so with scienter, or is it enough that some person in the corporate 
structure had the requisite state of mind?”30 In response, the Sixth Circuit formulated a “middle 
ground” approach, combining elements of the restrictive and liberal tests previously adopted by 
                                                        
25 KBC Asset Mgmt. N.V. v. Omnicare, Inc. (In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 769 F.3d 455, 469 
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309,1317 
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
26 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976). 
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). 
28 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197. 
29 McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 5. 
30 Id. 
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other courts of appeal over the last decade and adding its view to the existing circuit split on the 
issue.31 
To ensure the scienter requirement was properly met in the PSLRA, Congress required 
that the state of mind of the defendant must be connected to the act of deception: “[I]n any 
private action arising under [the PSLRA] in which the plaintiff may recover money damages 
only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with 
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”32 
As scienter relates to fraud, it must comply the standards of Rule 9(b).33 Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) requires the plaintiffs in securities fraud causes to plead with particularity 
the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud. 34  To satisfy Rule 9(b)'s pleading 
requirements, the plaintiffs must “specify the statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the 
speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain why the statements were 
fraudulent.”35  In securities fraud cases, a heightened pleading standard provides defendants with 
“fair notice of the plaintiffs' claims, protects defendants from harm to their reputation and 
goodwill, reduces the number of strike suits, and prevents plaintiffs from filing baseless claims 
and then attempting to discover unknown wrongs.”36 The PSLRA reinforces the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b), requiring the plaintiffs to state not only the time, place, the identity of 
                                                        
31 Id. 
32 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A) 
33 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) 
34 Id. 
35 Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
36 Id. at 363. (quoting Tuchman v. DSC Communications, 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
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the speaker, and the content of the alleged misrepresentation, but also to explain why the 
challenged statement or omission is false or misleading.37  
What constitutes the scienter element in a securities suit remains a question of law by the 
federal circuit courts although the United States Supreme Court created a three-part test for lower 
courts to apply in assessing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's scienter allegations.38 In this test, a 
court must first “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true.”39 Second, a court “must 
consider the complaint in its entirety” and decide “whether all of the facts alleged, taken 
collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, 
scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard.”40 Third, assuming that plaintiff's allegations create 
a “powerful or cogent” inference of scienter, a court must compare this inference with other 
competing possibilities, allowing the complaint to go forward “only if a reasonable person would 
deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one 
could draw from the facts alleged.”41  
When the defendant is an individual, the court examines the facts and “applies this test … 
considering the Helwig factors such as whether there was: (1) insider trading at a suspicious time 
or in an unusual amount; (2) divergence between internal reports and external statements on the 
same subject; (3) closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later 
disclosure of inconsistent information; (4) evidence of bribery by a top company official; (5) 
existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company and the company's quick 
settlement of that suit; (6) disregard of the most current factual information before making 
                                                        
37 Id. at 363 (quoting Williams, 112 F.3d at 177). 
38 In re Omnicare, 769 F.3d at, 473. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 
U.S. 308, 322-23 (2007).  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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statements; (7) disclosure of accounting information in such a way that its negative implications 
could only be understood by someone with a high degree of sophistication; (8) the personal 
interest of certain directors in not informing disinterested directors of an impending sale of stock; 
and (9) the self-interested motivation of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs.42 
A stronger inference that the defendant made her statement with the requisite state of mind can 
be drawn when a greater number of these factors are present.43 
Determining scienter becomes more complicated when the defendant is a corporation 
because there is the additional question of whose knowledge and state of mind matters.44 In 
scienter cases, there are often “two competing inferences (always assuming of course that the 
plaintiffs are able to prove the allegations of the complaint).”45 One inference is the company 
knew or was reckless in failing to realize, that the statements were false, which is material to 
investors.46 The other inference is that although the statements were false and material, their 
falsity was the result of innocent, or at worst careless, mistakes at the executive level.47 For 
example, “[s]uppose a clerical worker in the company's finance department accidentally 
overstated the company's earnings and the erroneous figure got reported in good faith up the line 
to…senior management, who then included the figure in their public announcements.”48 Even if 
senior management failed to detect the error, there would be no corporate scienter.49 For liability 
to attach to the corporation, must the person misrepresenting a material fact in the name of the 
                                                        
42 In re Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 473 (quoting Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 552.(6th Cir. 
2001)). 
43 In re Omnicare, 769 F.3d at, 473.  
44 Id. 
45 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2008) 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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corporation have also done so with scienter, or is it enough that some person in the corporate 
structure had the requisite state of mind.50 If the latter conception is correct, how high in the 
hierarchy of the corporation must the person with scienter be located, and what must his 
relationship be to the statement? The Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on these questions.51 
A. Narrow Interpretation of Corporate Scienter: Respondeat Superior Approach  
Some courts have adopted the view that scienter may be imputed to the corporation only 
where the person who made the alleged misstatement attributable to the company in fact made 
the statement with knowledge of its falsity.52 In 2004, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits adopted a 
narrow view to corporate scienter in tandem with common-law-fraud principles, allowing 
scienter to be imputed to the corporation only under a theory of respondeat superior.53 These 
circuits “look[ed] to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or officials who make 
or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who furnish 
information or language for inclusion therein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective 
knowledge of all of the corporation's officers and employees acquired in the course of their 
employment.”54  
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the PSLRA requires the plaintiffs to distinguish among 
those they sue and enlighten each defendant as to his or her particular part in the alleged fraud.55 
As such, corporate officers may not be held responsible for unattributed corporate statements 
                                                        
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Joseph M. McLaughlin, Pleading Corporate Scienter: Circuits Split on Standard, 252 
N.Y.L.J. 5, (2014) (referring to Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, 365 F.3d 353, 
366 (5th Cir. 2004); In re Tyson Foods, 155 Fed. Appx. 53, 57 (3d Cir. 2005); Phillips v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, 374 F.3d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
53 In re Omnicare, 769 F.3d at 473. 
54 Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) 
55 Id. at 365. 
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solely on the basis of their titles, even if their general level of day-to-day involvement in the 
corporation's affairs is pleaded. 56  “Liability [for scienter] requires…that the party make a 
statement…with ‘scienter’ meaning an ‘intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud’ or that ‘severe 
recklessness’ in which the ‘danger of misleading buyers or sellers . . . is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.’”57  
To determine whether a statement made by the corporation was made by it with the 
requisite scienter, “the state of mind of the individual corporate official or officials who make[s] 
or issue[s] the statement (or order[s] or approve[s] it or its making or issuance, or who 
furnish[es] information or language for inclusion therein, or the like) rather than generally to the 
collective knowledge of all the corporation's officers and employees acquired in the course of 
their employment.”58  “A defendant corporation is deemed to have the requisite scienter for fraud 
only if the individual corporate officer making the statement has the requisite level of scienter, 
i.e., knows that the statement is false, or is at least deliberately reckless as to its falsity, at the 
time he or she makes the statement.”59 This is consistent with the general common law rule that 
for example, in the case of fraud, an essentially subjective state of mind is an element of a cause 
of action also involving some sort of conduct, such as a misrepresentation, where the required 
state of mind must actually exist in the individual making (or be a cause of the making of) the 
misrepresentation, and may not simply be imputed to that individual on general principles of 
agency.60 Accordingly, for purposes of evaluating whether the complaint states with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that determines “where a party had the requisite 
                                                        
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 365 (quoting Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc)). 
58 Southland, 365 F.3d at 365-366. 
59 Id. 
60 Id  366-367. (quoting Restatement (2nd), Agency § 275, comment b; § 268 comment d.) 
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scienter…it is only necessary…to address the allegations claimed to adequately show such state 
of mind on the part of the individual defendants.”61  The Eleventh Circuit echoed the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Southland in Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc.62 Similarly, the Third Circuit 
ruled that an individual defendant who made allegedly misleading statements did not act with the 
requisite state of mind, and it therefore concluded that the corporate defendant could not be held 
liable.63 
B. Broader Interpretation of Corporate Scienter 
1. Seventh Circuit Approach 
The Seventh Circuit recognized that “it is possible to draw a strong inference of corporate 
scienter without being able to name the individuals who concocted and disseminated the 
fraud.”64  The court reasoned through a hypothetical: “Suppose General Motors announced that it 
had sold one million SUVs in 2006, and the actual number was zero.”65 There would be a strong 
inference of corporate scienter, since corporate officials who were sufficiently knowledgeable 
about the company would have approved such a dramatic announcement. 66  Because these 
officials possess this knowledge, they should know that the announcement was in fact false.67 In 
that case however, the Seventh Circuit did not have to rely upon an expansive view of collective 
corporate scienter because the court held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded that the CEO 
                                                        
61 Id. 
62 See Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004) 
63 In re Tyson Foods, 155 Fed. Appx. 53, 57 (3d Cir. 2005).  
64 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008). 
65 Id. at 711. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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knowingly misrepresented material facts with the intent to defraud and that his individual 
liability could be imputed to the corporation.68 
2. Second Circuit Approach 
Somewhat similarly, the Second Circuit agreed that plaintiffs could plead collective 
corporate scienter, at least in some cases, and overcome the PSLRA's requirements.69 The court 
stated: “[it] do[es] not believe that [Congress] imposed the rule . . . that in no case can corporate 
scienter be pleaded in the absence of successfully pleading scienter as to an expressly named 
officer.”70 “When the defendant is a corporate entity…the pleaded facts must create a strong 
inference that someone whose intent could be imputed to the corporation acted with the requisite 
scienter.”71 The court reasoned that in most cases, the most straightforward way to raise an 
inference for a corporate defendant was to plead it for an individual defendant but it is also 
possible to raise the required inference to a corporate defendant without identifying an individual 
officer or employee.72 
3. Ninth Circuit Approach 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also added to this position in the spectrum of cases, stating that 
it “had at that time not categorically rejected the concept of ‘collective scienter’” and that “there 
could be circumstances in which a company's public statements were so important and so 
dramatically false that they would create a strong inference that at least some corporate officials 
                                                        
68 Id.  
69 Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 196 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
70 Id. 
71 Teamsters, 531 F.3d at 195. 
72 Id. 
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knew of the falsity upon publication.”73 The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed it previous holding in 
Janas v. McCracken (In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation), stating that “plaintiffs 
proceeding under the PSLRA can no longer claim intent in general terms of mere ‘motive’ and 
‘opportunity’ or ‘recklessness,’ but rather, must state specific facts indicating no less than a 
degree of recklessness that strongly suggests actual intent.”74 Yet, importantly, the Ninth Circuit 
clarified its previous holding in Nordstrom, stating that it “does not foreclose the possibility that, 
in certain circumstances, some form of collective scienter pleading might be appropriate.”75 
C. Broadest Interpretation of Corporate Scienter: Earlier Sixth Circuit Approach in 2005 
Previously, the Sixth Circuit employed the most lenient scienter standard out of all the 
circuit courts of appeal. The standard allowed the court to impute the knowledge of a corporate 
officer to the corporation even though that officer did not issue the false or misleading 
statement.76 For example, in City of Monroe, the plaintiffs alleged that the corporation made 
several material misrepresentations in its annual report, and the court held that these statements 
were actionable. 77  Plaintiffs also alleged that the CEO had actual knowledge that these 
statements were false or misleading, and the court held that this knowledge could be attributed to 
the corporation, even though the complaint failed to link the CEO to the issuance of the 
statements.78 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit “employed a totality of the circumstances analysis [in 
its scienter analysis] whereby the facts argued collectively must give rise to a strong inference of 
                                                        
73 Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted). 
74 Id. at 743 (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation 
quoting 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
75 Id. 
76 City of Monroe Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 683 (6th Cir.. 2005) 
77 Id. at 680-81. 
78 Id. at 688-89.  
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at least recklessness.”79  Furthermore, in its reasoning, the court identified at least five of the nine 
Helwig factors that are apparent in the complaint's alleged facts. 80  First, there was a clear 
“divergence between internal reports and external statements on the same subject.”81 There was 
also a “closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure 
of inconsistent information” as well as a “disregard,” or at least a seeming disregard, of “the 
most current factual information before making statements.”82  As a result, the Sixth Circuit 
decided that the plaintiffs' suit could go forward against the corporation, concluding that the 
scienter requirement was properly met.83  
D. The Middle Ground Approach to Corporate Scienter: KBC Asset Mgmt. N.V. v. 
Omnicare, Inc. – Current Sixth Circuit Approach 
1. Factual Background 
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant corporation’s Form 10-Ks from 2007 to 2010 
contained material misrepresentations because they stated that “[Omnicare] believe[s] that [its] 
billing practices materially comply with applicable state and federal requirements” and that 
“[defendant corporation] believe[s] that [it is] in compliance in all material respects with federal, 
state and local laws.” 84  The Complaint also stated specifically which of the defendant 
corporation’s officers signed these misleading forms. 85  The issue here is that defendant 
                                                        
79 City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 683 (quoting PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 683 
(6th Cir. 2004)). 
80 PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 684 (quoting Helwig, 251 F.3d at 551). 
81 City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 683.  
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 689.  
84 KBC Asset Mgmt. N.V. v. Omnicare, Inc. (In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 769 F.3d 455, 464 
(6th Cir. 2014) 
85 Id. 
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corporation received unfavorable audit results when it conducted three audits of its practices.86 
The plaintiffs further claimed that the defendant corporation failed in its duty to disclose the 
audit results once it knew of them, creating an actionable omission.87 
With respect to scienter, plaintiffs alleged that each of the defendants knew that their 
statements and those of the company, which they personally prepared, were false and 
misleading. 88  Plaintiffs further stated that the defendants here were privy to confidential 
information that they had a duty to disclose, and by choosing not to do so, they acted with the 
requisite intent to defraud.89 According to the plaintiffs, the personal acquisition of wealth drove 
the individual defendants to commit fraud, and the defendants purportedly amassed wealth by 
permitting fraudulent Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements, which allegedly accounted for 
more than half of Omnicare's business during the class period.90  
  2. Current Sixth Circuit Standard 
To resolve the issue presented in the KBC Asset Mgmt. N.V. v. Omnicare, Inc, the Sixth 
Circuit created a middle ground approach to scienter.91 Under this approach, the state(s) of mind 
of any of the following people are probative for purposes of determining whether a 
misrepresentation made by a corporation has the requisite scienter under Section 10(b):  
“(a) The individual agent who uttered or issued the misrepresentation; (b) Any 
individual agent who authorized, requested, commanded, furnished information 
for, prepared (including suggesting or contributing language for inclusion therein 
or omission therefrom), reviewed, or approved the statement in which the 
misrepresentation was made before its utterance or issuance; (c) Any high 
                                                        
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 464. 
91 Id. at 476. 
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managerial agent or member of the board of directors who ratified, recklessly 
disregarded, or tolerated the misrepresentation after its utterance or issuance.”92  
 
This new standard is the Sixth Circuit’s attempt to bridge the gap in the spectrum of 
scienter interpretations pertaining to securities fraud cases.93 
ARGUMENT 
A. Is this new standard really an improvement? 
The new standard is better than what courts have routinely used.  Although the old 
standard was a more formalistic, rule driven approach, it did not fully cater to the public policy 
driven broad interpretation of scienter. Yet, the middle ground approach appears to be more of an 
upper middle ground approach rather than a true middle ground approach that strikes a 
harmonious balance between the two ends of the scienter spectrum. The standard still leans 
towards an ultra-heightened pleading standard, one which supporters of the narrow scienter 
approach desire. 
B. Advantages of the New Sixth Circuit Approach Over the other Circuit Approaches 
This middle ground approach still aligns with the Sixth Circuit’s early ruling on 
scienter.94 The Sixth Circuit reconciled its previous decision in City of Monroe, stating that its 
current findings were consistent its previous decision although it qualifies some of that opinion's 
overly broad language. 95  While some of the language in City of Monroe suggests that the 
knowledge of any agent of the company could be imputed to the corporation, the court relied on 
the CEO's knowledge, a person included in Part C of the new standard.96 The Sixth Circuit 
determined that the broader language of the City of Monroe decision is not necessary to arrive at 
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that panel's conclusion and is thus, dicta.97 Moreover, the result of City of Monroe would not 
change under the clarification of the new standard because the CEO's knowledge would still be 
imputed to the corporation.98 
Also, this new rule “largely prevents corporations from evading liability through “tacit  
encouragement and willful ignorance, as they potentially could under a strict respondeat 
superior approach.”99  Where there is no identifiable culpable actor, the respondeat superior 
approach could allow corporations that condone illegal activity the opportunity to escape 
liability.100 Such an approach could incentivize companies inclined to commit fraud to isolate the 
individuals speaking on the company's behalf from any facts that may contradict their public 
statements. 101  Under the new rule, however, a “corporation is not insulated if lower-level 
employees, contributing to the misstatement, knowingly provide false information to their 
superiors with the intent to defraud the public.”102 As a result, corporations that willfully permit 
or encourage the shielding of bad news from management will potentially be liable and 
therefore, the purpose of the 1934 Act will be served.103  
Additionally, the new rule protects corporations from liability or strike suits when one 
individual unknowingly makes a false statement that another individual, unrelated to the 
preparation or issuance of the statement, knew to be false or misleading.104  By allowing courts 
to examine only the states of mind of lower-level employees connected to the statements, the 
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new rule “prevents plaintiffs from abusing the broad dicta in City of Monroe and running afoul of 
the PSLRA.”105 
While a broader view of collective corporate scienter would most likely discourage 
managers of companies from deliberately separating the employees making public statements 
with knowledge of the company's transgressions from those employees who do not know,106 the 
Sixth Circuit acknowledged that a more expansive approach “could expose corporations to 
liability far beyond what Congress has authorized.”107 The problem with inferring a collective 
intent to deceive behind the act of a corporation is that the hierarchical corporate structure makes 
it plausible that fraud, though ordinarily a deliberate act, could be the result of a series of acts 
none of which was both done with scienter and imputable to the company through the 
respondeat superior doctrine.108 Someone low in the corporate hierarchy might make a mistake 
that formed the premise of a statement made at the executive level by someone who was at 
worst, careless in having failed to catch the mistake. 109  Applying the respondeat superior 
approach to such an example would impute a scienter to the corporation that none of its 
employees or directors had in the first place.110 
 Also, the “group pleading doctrine conflicts with the scienter requirement of the PSLRA” 
because “the PSLRA requires . . . plaintiffs to distinguish among those they sue and 
enlighten each defendant as to his or her particular part in the alleged fraud.” 111 
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The PSLRA raised the pleading requirements for scienter in an attempt to discourage frivolous 
securities litigation.112 Under the collective scienter approach, plaintiffs are able to pass the 
motion to dismiss stage too easily.113 By doing so, plaintiffs now have increased their chances of 
reaching large settlements with corporate defendants, thereby undermining the purpose of the 
PSLRA.114 
C. The New Middle Ground v. the Old Middle Ground 
Previously, the Fifth Circuit’s Southland approach was titled the semi-strong-form or 
middle ground approach of corporate scienter.115 In order to prove that a corporate defendant 
acted with scienter under that approach, a plaintiff must provide evidence showing that an 
individual agent who is connected to but not necessarily the creator of the misstatement at issue 
had scienter. 116  Regardless of whether a plaintiff has to identify scienter for an individual 
connected to a corporate misstatement or the creator of the misstatement herself, the plaintiff still 
faces a challenging burden to satisfy the PSLRA.117  Identifying scienter is no easy task without 
next to concrete proof as it is often difficult to produce this evidence at the pleading stage of a 
securities fraud action.118  
When compared to the new Sixth Circuit Omnicare standard, the Fifth Circuit’s approach 
is far from the middle of the spectrum in determining scienter. The Fifth Circuit’s method of 
specifying scienter to an individual agent is somewhat engulfed in part A of the new middle 
ground for scienter which allows the state of mind of an individual agent who issued the 
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misrepresentation to be probative for determining whether a misrepresentation made by a 
corporation was made with the requisite intent.119 Yet, the new standard still has more to offer to 
a plaintiff through parts B and C. Slanting too far toward the Fifth Circuit's approach risks 
running counter to the goals and purposes of the 1934 Act, which includes fostering “an attitude 
of full disclosure by publicly traded corporations, rather than a philosophy of caveat emptor for 
securities buyers.”120 Accordingly, the Fifth’s Circuit’s approach is more appropriately part of 
the narrow approach to scienter. 
D. The Middle Ground Reaches a Similar Result as the Narrow Interpretation 
 The Sixth Circuit claims that there is such a substantial difference between the narrow 
interpretation and its new middle ground standard. 121  However, when the middle ground 
approach is applied to a case with a sufficient pleading that did not meet the Fifth Circuit’s 
narrow approach, the same result is achieved.122 
 In Southland, plaintiffs contended that defendants “engaged in a fraudulent scheme to 
deceive investors about the company's performance for the purpose of inflating the price of 
INSpire stock for their own financial benefit.”123 The defendants allegedly committed securities 
fraud by knowingly, or with severe recklessness, advertising INSpire's software products and 
contracts despite their knowledge of the flawed software, issuing inaccurate earnings and 
revenue estimates, and violating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) by failing 
to timely classify receivables as uncollectible, improperly capitalizing software development 
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costs, and failing to write down goodwill associated with purchases of software assets.124  The 
plaintiffs assert these misleading statements were made in “forward-looking statements, press 
releases, and other corporate documents, and relied upon by analysts in their reports” and 
subsequently sold stock based on this information.125 The Fifth Circuit did not allow plaintiffs to 
rely on a presumption that statements in “prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, 
press releases, or other group-published information, are the collective work of those individuals 
with direct involvement in the everyday business of the company.”126 Even though the top-level 
officers and directors such as the Treasurer and CFO in this case, certify the accuracy of those 
documents, the Fifth Circuit did not feel comfortable allowing plaintiffs to use a group pleading 
doctrine. 127  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants 
committed fraud by reporting the company's results for the fourth quarter of 1997 and year end 
1997 failed to meet the pleading requirements because the plaintiffs failed to explain how or in 
what particular way the reported earnings and revenues figures were inaccurate.128 Accordingly, 
the Fifth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that the defendants knew 
the figures were false relied on “group pleading” and failed to plead facts with the requisite 
specificity to generate a strong inference of scienter.129  
Applying the middle ground approach to the facts ultimately arrives at the same end. 
Similar to Omnicare, the directors in Southland published incorrect and misleading information 
in their financial documents.130 Comparable to the Vice President defendant in Omnicare, the 
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Treasurer/CFO’s knowledge in Southland could be imputed to the corporation because he was 
the officer who certified the corporation’s financial documents.131 Yet as in Omnicare, pleading 
that level of information is not sufficient to suggest a strong inference that the corporate 
defendant in Southland acted to defraud the public and satisfy the middle ground standard.132 
Even though only a limited number of scenarios could have taken place such as the officer being 
complicit in the scheme or the officer lacking the competence to determine that there was 
mistake. However, the either of those two situations paired with the simultaneous coincidence 
that there was also a significant opportunity to profit should balance the strong interference 
toward the notion that the corporate defendant did act with requisite scienter to defraud the 
public. 
Even in a case where the most narrow standard is applied and Sixth Circuit’s new 
approach is also applied to the same facts, the same result is still achieved: a plaintiff lacking 
sufficient pleading for scienter. The set of facts in Southland or Omnicare are not in the group of 
outliers as rare factual occurrences that seldom transpire in the business world but rather 
common issues that corporate defendants face. If the middle ground standard only works 
sometimes in somewhat ideal factual circumstances, then does it really provide all the benefits 
that it purports to have? 
E. Still Not in the Middle as a Standard 
Admittedly, the current Sixth Circuit approach is a more reasonable middle ground when 
compared to Southland and Bridgestone on the other end of the spectrum of scienter. However, 
this new standard is still not at the midpoint of the scienter continuum. The issue is that modern 
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corporate structure necessitates the use of a broader form of corporate scienter.133 The Sixth 
Circuit attempts to reach a broader approach through parts B and C of its new standard 
articulated in Omnicare. Part B considers the state of mind probative for any individual agent of 
the corporation who authorized, requested, commanded, furnished information for, prepared, 
reviewed or approved the statement in which the misrepresentation was made before its 
issuance.134  And Part C addresses a managerial agent or board member who ratified, tolerated or 
recklessly disregarded the misrepresentation after its issuance.135 Parts B and C initially appear to 
cast a broader net in terms of flexibility to find scienter existed but Omnicare demonstrates 
otherwise. 
In Omnicare, the Sixth Circuit held that the complaint did not sufficiently meet the 
scienter requirements because of a lack of specificity. 136  Although the plaintiff identified a 
defendant officer who presented the misrepresentation, the audit report, which evidenced that 
pervasive fraud had been underway, and not disclosed to the public to the Omnicare’s Internal 
Audit and Compliance committee, the plaintiff still needed to provide more information to meet 
the scienter requirement.137 Even though, the court concluded that while a reasonable jury could 
find a divergence between internal reports (the audits) and external statements, there is still an 
inference that corporations have certain levels of generality at which the internal reports and 
external statements are framed.138  The court determined that this inference runs contrary to 
finding scienter.139 The Sixth Circuit concluded that if a well-plead complaint can only allege 
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that a corporation intended to defraud based on a desire to continue earning money, without 
showing a particular link between the actual statement and a specific payment, then the 
heightened pleading standard for scienter has no bite.140 The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion further 
suggests that its middle ground approach is swaying toward the narrow end of the scienter 
continuum. The application of the Sixth Circuit standard in Omnicare alludes that plaintiffs need 
more that what their standard indicates. Although the plaintiff seemingly met part B of the 
standard and scienter should have been found, it was not. 
The issue in Omnicare and generally for corporations is that corporations 
compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into 
smaller components.141 The sum total of those elements constitutes the corporation's knowledge 
of a particular project.142 Through this technique, corporations often escape liability particularly 
in securities fraud actions because scienter is difficult to impute under these circumstances since 
it is increasingly difficult to find evidence corroborating scienter against individual agents. 
Ultimately, it is irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an operation 
know the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the operation.143 A 
corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several 
employees was not acquired by any one individual who then would have comprehended its full 
importance or effects on other parts of the business.144 There must be a means to determine a 
when corporation acquires the collective knowledge of its employees, and in that circumstance, 
the corporation would be held responsible for its employees and their failure to act 
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accordingly.145 While this reasoning does point toward the broader approaches to scienter, an 
appropriate balance between the spectrum of broad and narrow approaches and public policy 
underlying each one must still be achieved. For example, any positive influence the use of weak-
form scienter might have on corporate policy is drastically overshadowed by its inconsistency 
with the federal securities laws, the inefficient incentives it creates, and its negative impact on 
the dissemination of information. 146  Yet at the same time, the strongest and narrowest 
approaches to scienter also run contrary to the congressional intent behind the PSLRA.  
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit standard is sufficient and better than the alternatives 
currently in the federal circuit courts. However, there does not appear to be that much of a 
distinction between the middle ground and narrow approaches when the middle ground approach 
is applied to scenario with sufficient facts to meet the pleading sufficiency.  As a result, an 
appropriate balance should be struck to have an actual middle ground standard. This standard 
would ideally allow plaintiffs in cases such as Omnicare to move past the pleading stages and 
satisfy the scienter requirement without running against the congressional intent of the PSLRA. 
To combat this issue, a better standard to corporate scienter is needed because corporations are 
still afforded too much latitude in escaping liability in securities fraud actions through the 
scienter requirement. The narrow approach to scienter almost categorically favors corporate 
defendants and the spectrum of broad approaches run opposite to the public policy surrounding 
the PSLRA and Rule 9(b). Ideally, the Supreme Court will opine on this issue and create this 
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actual middle ground standard required to resolve the discrepancy in evaluating corporate 
scienter. 
